To the reader: Francisco is not a believer but I follow his writings for a number of reasons. First, he is a fierce defender of the Israeli people and all Jewish people. Secondly, he is a prolific writer and speaker.
From Francisco Gil-White.substack.com
I wish to speak of the psychiatric pressure to accept consensus reality. Meaning this: there are certain mainstream claims—‘consensus’ claims—about reality, that, under threat of being declared ‘crazy,’ we all learn to accept as Reality. This pressure dominates us. Because of that, it may be abused by the State.
That’s worrisome. Is it happening? We ought to investigate.
We need to ascertain:
- whether the State is controlled by Machiavellian bosses;
- whether the bosses have such control over our meaning-making and reality-creating institutions—namely, mainstream media and established academia—that they can define consensus reality; and
- the manner in which this psychiatric pressure works, creating an opening for the bosses to manipulate us.
Only by conducting such investigations can we learn how to modify the institutional design of modern democracy to protect ourselves from being manipulated.
The sociological and psychological investigation of the psychiatric pressure to accept consensus reality is thus fundamental to any theory-based effort hoping to lay the groundwork for a future democratic West.
I hope that pitch is enough to keep you reading.
Since I have other articles where I document points 1 and 2 above, I will take those for granted here, focusing on point 3.
I’ll begin with Solomon Asch’s famous studies of conformity, for in them we find the clearest laboratory expression of the psychiatric pressure to accept consensus reality. And I’ll take it from there.
Solomon Asch’s conformity experiments
Solomon Asch, one of the truly profound social psychologists, did many great and clever things. One, very famous, was his investigation of this cognitive adaptation that I have, utterly mindless (and sometimes infuriating), which makes me want to align my behaviors, ideas, thoughts, beliefs, etc. with whatever most relevant others around me are already broadcasting.
You have this cognitive adaptation too—it’s a human thing. In academic social science we call it the conformist bias.1
How did Solomon Asch study this? By conning people.
Social psychologists long ago decided that, since their intention was to learn about human behavior, they were justified in employing, like skilled conmen, lies, props, and even actors to fool the experimental subject (that term is entirely appropriate) into accepting a managed social reality serving the investigator’s purposes. No doubt this is great fun for the psychologists, but the scientific payoff in thus pranking the subjects is that one may precisely design the stimulus they will respond to.
Asch generously availed himself of such methods. To get the full impact of that, adopt the perspective of a naïve participant in his conformity experiments.
There you are, happily about, almost whistling to yourself as you go, and you enter into Asch’s lab to help out with an experiment that, you were told, means to study aspects of visual perception. Seven other experimental participants are already in the room. Smiling placidly, you take the remaining seat, which is in the second-to-last position.
The experimenter takes two big cards and puts them side by side on an easel. Both cards have large vertical lines printed on them. The card on the left has just one line: the reference line; the card on the right has three lines of different lengths labeled A, B, and C. The task is like this: you must identify which of the three lines—A, B, or C—is equal in length to the reference line.
Any idiot can solve this problem: one line is obviously the right answer; the other two are not even close. Participants answer in their seated order, so you go second-to-last. Everybody—including you—answers correctly. It couldn’t be otherwise. Does any of this surprise you? Certainly not. This stupid exercise must be a warm-up. Life is so good—you are smiling still.
A second pair of cards goes up. The experience is again the same. Easy peasy. Ho hum. Another warm-up.
But then, in the third task, something unbelievable happens.

The experimenter puts the above two cards on the easel. As you can see, once again the task is numbingly easy. The correct answer is obviously ‘B.’ And yet, the first participant answers ‘A.’
What?
The second does the same: ‘A.’ What is going on? And then the third, fourth, fifth, sixth: ‘A,’ ‘A,’ ‘A,’ ‘A.’ Now it’s your turn. What do you do?
“Your eyes give you a clear answer to the experimenter’s simple question: ‘B’ is obviously right. But all of those people said ‘A.’ There is something wrong here; either you can’t see, or you misunderstood the instructions, or something else is going on. Maybe they got the instructions wrong: maybe they can’t see. But how likely is that? After all, they all gave the same wrong answer. And what a fool you’ll be if you answer ‘B’ and ‘A’ is the right answer. They’ll probably laugh at you… Will you go along, or let on that you are a fool?”2
Unbeknownst to you, the other seven are not real experimental subjects but confederates of the experimenter playing entirely scripted roles. And the real point of the experiment is not to study any aspect of visual perception but to produce the mental torture—induced by the social context of the experimental setup—that my former colleague at UPENN Psychology, the late John Sabini, so effectively represented above. Asch wanted to know this: Would people experiencing such inner torment publicly deny reality in order to avoid looking deviant?
You already know what Asch found. Though their eyes could plainly see that ‘B’ was the right answer, a surprisingly large number of his naive participants, way more than Asch remotely expected, went along with the experimentally created local majority and answered ‘A.’
Does this remind you of Hans Christian Andersen’s tale, The Emperor’s New Clothes? It should. In that story, multitudes praise the silly emperor’s new sartorial acquisition (which doesn’t exist; he is naked) because they’ve heard that fools cannot see these alleged ‘new clothes,’ and none—least of all the emperor—wish to let on that they can’t see them!

Andersen is a classic because he captured something human.
All of Asch’s critical (real) subjects were no doubt having vaguely similar subjective experiences, but one of them was almost brave enough to consider testing reality. After it was explained to him in the debriefing that only he was a real naive participant in the experiment, and that the other people in the room with him had been ‘confederates’ (that is, actors helping Asch set up the con), he said: “I thought so, but wondered if I had paranoid tendencies.”3
Think about that. For one second during the experiment, as he watched others unanimously give an obviously wrong answer, which in context seemed impossible, this young man considered the hypothesis that everyone around him was acting and pretending just for his benefit. Preferring not to be insane, though, he chased that ‘paranoid’ hypothesis away.
I think this is profoundly interesting. This subject witnessed an extreme behavior and produced, accordingly, an extreme hypothesis to explain it: that everyone around him was cooperating in the creation of a fake reality intended only for him—in other words, that this was some sort of prank. Yet the mere presence of that hypothesis in his head—though it was, in fact, the right hypothesis!—made this subject doubt his own sanity.
No doubt we can sympathize with him. Any radical test of reality will have that ‘going crazy’ feel to it, and we have a horror of that. That horror we feel—the horror of needing to subject consensus reality to a radical test—is precisely what I call thepsychiatric pressure to accept consensus reality.
This pressure is not the conformist bias, though it does interact with it. This pressure does not exist in societies without psychiatrists. It results from the functional relationship that must inevitably develop between professional psychiatry and the modern State, as I now explain.
The structural-functional linkage between psychiatry and the State
Psychiatrists are the professionals authorized by the State, for State purposes, to define ‘insanity.’ If the State is controlled by Machiavellian bosses, therefore, they will use the vast powers of the State to create incentives for psychiatrists to define ‘insanity’ so the concept will include those ideas and behaviors that are politically inconvenient to the bosses.
But would psychiatrists likely respond to such incentives? Would they allow their discipline to be turned, in this manner, into a pseudoscience? Yes. To see why, consider the pre-existing structure, before any outside corrupting influence is introduced.
Psychiatrists are the experts consulted when the mind appears to go wrong. Because of that, their power and income both grow if many things that we all do are shunted into the categories of mentally ‘abnormal’ or ‘unhealthy.’ Psychiatrists therefore already have powerful symbolic and material incentives to pathologize us, progressively squeezing into almost nothing the category ‘normal.’ To avoid this outcome, you’d need a tremendous institutional effort—supported and enforced by the State—to force on psychiatry the most exacting professional standards and ethics.
If the situation is exactly the opposite, namely, that Machiavellian bosses in control of the State want the psychiatrists expanding the definition of ‘insanity’ so that anything inconvenient to the bosses can be pathologized, there will be no stopping this. The consequence will be that our Machiavellian bosses will acquire the power to discursively marginalize political dissidents and, at the limit, imprison them under guise of medical diagnosis and treatment.
Now, once this articulated classificatory and regulatory environment has been imposed, it produces in the individual a mental experience vaguely analogous to heretical fear of the Inquisition. For even when the functional linkages outlined here are not too explicitly perceived, we will still feel intuitively, and powerfully, the implicit threat that others might consider us ‘crazy,’ as we all know that such diagnoses can ruin a life.
We all silently worry about this.
Thus, even when our own eyes seem loudly to demand that we question the reality construct locally imposed, as happens to naive participants in Solomon Asch’s conformity experiment, we nevertheless feel an enormous pressure to accept this consensus reality. In fact, we cultivate a studied docility towards consensus reality, lest we bring upon our heads an accusation or—worse—a diagnosis of insanity.
What happens when ‘sane’ is equated with ‘normal’?
For psychiatrists the term ‘insanity,’ historically, has a strong semantic attachment to psychosis, wherein a person has trouble separating fantasy from reality. A diagnosis of insanity, therefore, must answer the question: Can this person accurately perceive reality?
But a giant problem is introduced if psychiatrists equate ‘reality’ with ‘conventional beliefs anchored to consensual validation’ because psychiatrists are cultural creatures, born and raised in particular societies. As such, they’ll tend to consider as ‘mental illness’ those performances that contradict what is locally normative in their own cultural environment. After all, that is how the term ‘crazy’ has always been everywhere abused.

Psychologist Erich Fromm explained this problem in The Sane Society, where he warned us against falling prey to naive assumptions:
“It is naively assumed that the fact that the majority of people share certain ideas or feelings proves the validity of these ideas and feelings. Nothing is further from the truth. Consensual validation as such has no bearing whatsoever on reason or mental health. Just as there is a ‘folie à deux’ there is a ‘folie à millions.’ The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane.”
Fromm was thinking chiefly of the utterly crazy Third Reich, as he was a Frankfurt Jew whose early decision to leave Germany upon Hitler’s ascension to power had saved him from the Nazis.
Because Fromm’s warning was not heeded, the terms ‘sanity’ and ‘insanity’ have accrued the following connotations in psychiatric discourse:

As a token example, consider a paper contributed to Schizophrenia Bulletin and titled ‘The Spectrum of Sanity and Insanity’ (2010).
The author, himself a recovering schizophrenic, explains that during a schizophrenic break (an example of psychosis) “one moves between the spectrum of sanity and insanity and is gradually pulled from the clear light of reason to that of madness.” His “insane thoughts” at first “seemed normal and plausible,” to him, “if only a bit more creative,” but “eventually … [they] lost all bases in reality.”4
To tie the term ‘sanity’ to the allegedly associated terms normal, reason, and plausiblein this manner creates unsolvable problems. For isn’t a scientist abnormal who proposes a paradigm shift—a radical change—that in fact improves our model of reality? Won’t he initially be perceived as unreasonable and his claims as implausible—even far-fetched? Yet he is not insane.
Neither—mind you—are scientists automatically insane who deviate from the norm with worse models of reality (riddled with illogic and poor evidence). Most of them are just wrong.
Yet, by speaking like this psychiatrists have largely defined sane as conventional (‘normal’).
This psychiatric manner of speaking is a great boon to Machiavellian bosses if they already control the meaning-making and reality-creating institutions of media and academia, because, through such institutions, they get to create the mainstream, the acceptance of which then becomes, almost by definition, ‘normal.’ Then, if you reject the mainstream, you’ll be called ‘insane.’
This situation becomes even worse if, allied with the State and with Big Pharma, psychiatrists push the argument that ‘abnormal’ people, meaning those outside the mainstream, odd people, have a physical disease of the brain: a ‘chemical imbalance.’Especially if psychiatrists are allowed to medicate people without having to demonstrate such alleged ‘chemical imbalances.’
Amazingly, this is precisely the situation that we are apparently in.
You’ll need a pill for your ‘chemical imbalance’
Big Pharma have lots of psychoactive pills, and they charge for them, so the claim that insanity is a consequence of a ‘chemical imbalance in the brain’ is most convenient to Big Pharma. And it is convenient to psychiatrists, because the words ‘brain’ and ‘chemical’ have the power, quite magically, to confer on their work the social prestige of biological, medical science.
It is interesting to observe, therefore, as an opponent of this view explains, that:
“the chemical imbalance theory of depression/elation was first proposed at about the same time by two groups of psychiatric researchers, both of whom were working closely with pharmaceutical companies in the development of antidepressants, and both of whom were members of the Society of Biological Psychiatry. Incidentally, the Society of Biological Psychiatry was founded in 1946, and is still very active today.”5
The prestige of biological, medical science is precisely what the modern State needs in order to use psychiatric diagnoses effectively to oppress people—most cleverly—under guise of ‘helping’ them. It is most suspicious, therefore, that the State—in apparent cahoots with the Big Pharma companies—has been enthusiastically collaborating with this medical conceit of psychiatry.
Indeed, our highest State functionaries have been loudly insisting that ‘mental illness’—understood as an allegedly physical disease of the brain—is a reasonable scientific concept. In the United States, for example,
“In 1999, President William J. Clinton declared: ‘Mental illness can be accurately diagnosed, successfully treated, just as physical illness.’ Tipper Gore, President Clinton’s mental health adviser, stated: ‘One of the most widely believed and most damaging myths is that mental illness is not a physical disease. Nothing could be further from the truth.’ … A White House Fact Sheet on Myths and Facts about Mental Illness asserted: ‘Research in the last decade proves that mental illnesses are diagnosable disorders of the brain.’ In 2007, Joseph Biden … declared: ‘Addiction is a neurobiological disease—not a lifestyle choice—and it’s about time we start treating it as such.’ … At the same time, Biden introduced to the Senate a bill titled the Recognizing Addiction as a Disease Act. The legislation called for renaming the National Institute on Drug Abuse as the ‘National Institute on Diseases of Addiction,’ and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism as the ‘National Institute on Alcohol Disorders and Health.’ In 2008, Congress required insurance companies to provide people with mental illnesses ‘the same access to affordable coverage as those with physical illnesses.’ ”6
To all this, vehement opposing voices have been expressed, perhaps most eloquently in the work of psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, who became a historian and sociologist of psychiatry and a philosopher of science and democracy.

In The Myth of Mental Illness, Thomas Szasz argues that people who seek psychotherapy have “problems with living,” that is, with their adaptation to the local mainstream. Such problems are real and a therapist may help. But getting therapy is not so different from seeking the advice of your rabbi, priest, guru, your father, your mother, or your best friend (psychotherapists may have more relevant expertise, but the sufferer’s motivation is similar). These are social, not medical problems: “[so-called] mental illnesses are not, and cannot be, brain diseases,” Szasz flatly declares.7He will not negotiate this point.
But he is bolder still. He claims that “contemporary ‘biological’ psychiatrists” have already “tacitly recognized” the truth of his polemic, because, whatever they may otherwise loudly express, whenever a condition is shown to be caused by a documented pathology of brain tissue “it ceases to be classified as a mental disorder and is reclassified as a bodily disease.” Conversely,
“in the persistent absence of such evidence [of tissue pathology], a mental disorder becomes a nondisease. That is how one type of mental illness, neurosyphilis, became a brain disease, while another type, homosexuality, became reclassified as a nondisease.”8
But in fact—and here lies the crux of it—homosexuality was not reclassified as a nondisease just from the simple failure to find brain-tissue pathologies; there was also, from the days of Freud to the present, a cultural change.
In Freud’s time,
“by couching his observations and interventions in the language of medicine and pseudo-medicine, Freud made it appear as if he were morally detached or neutral. … [Yet] he not only speculated about the nature of homosexuality, but he also deplored it as a ‘perversion.’ ”9
Wasn’t Freud turning a social value into a medical diagnosis? He was. And that’s obvious from how, when Western values (recently) changed, psychiatrists became embarrassed to say that homosexuality was a disease and simply stopped.
But we must ask: What happens when the relevant value hasn’t changed, and hence no similar social pressure is exerted on psychiatrists? Well, then they go right along imposing by fiat the category ‘medically abnormal’ on run-of-the-mill human variation, calling whatever they like a ‘mental illness’ or a ‘personality disorder,’ and pretending—despite no evidence of tissue pathology—that these are brain diseases.
The arbitrariness of psychiatry is such that, even in cases where people had long been pathologized for a documented disconnection from reality, psychiatrists can simply decide to reinterpret them, following a cultural change, as healthy people expressing a minority identity! This is what happened to ‘gender identity disorder,’ which is now the ‘transgender identity.’

TRANS & ETHICS. (1) Dr. Marci Bowers, WPATH, the transgender debate, and the ethic of autonomy
The arbitrary baptismal powers of psychiatrists to create (and uncreate) ‘insane’ individuals by fiat are astonishing in their breadth. Also astonishing are the consequences, for individuals declared ‘insane’ by psychiatrists may—at the limit—be incarcerated by the authority of the same psychiatrists with the approval and connivance of the State. All of that, of course, is ideal to the Machiavellian—even psychopathic—bosses who control the State.
“For more than fifty years I have maintained that mental illnesses are counterfeit diseases (‘nondiseases’), that coerced psychiatric relations are like coerced labor relations (‘slavery’) or coerced sexual relations (rape), and I spent the better part of my professional life criticizing the concept of mental illness, objecting to the practices of involuntary-institutional psychiatry, and advocating the abolition of ‘psychiatric slavery’ and ‘psychiatric rape.’10
—Thomas Szasz
From all this I conclude that free citizens of the West must pay special attention to the personality ‘disorder’ most relevant to a person’s relationship with political reality: PPD.
Paranoid personality disorder (PPD)—when does it apply?
WebMD confesses that “The exact cause of PPD is not known.”11 This amounts to saying that no tissue pathology is yet understood to produce it. One cannot do a lab test on a blood sample or find it on an MRI.
How to diagnose?
Since, as WebMD also concedes, “we all have [paranoid] thoughts like this from time to time,”12 and since some of these thoughts may in some contexts be entirely reasonable (for example, if you are a critical subject in Solomon Asch’s experiment!), the psychiatrist is supposed to decide whether a given person’s paranoid thoughts are unwarranted.
This is usually confused with the question of whether a person’s paranoid thoughts are beyond normal.
And that confusion is a tremendous problem, because what is normal may be insane—for example, if you live in the Third Reich. Moreover, regardless of what kind of society you live in, ‘normal’ is a criterion that psychiatrists have the professional power radically to narrow. Indeed, WebMD explains that ‘paranoia’ is included in “ ‘Cluster A’ personality disorders, which involve odd or eccentric ways of thinking.”13
Odd or eccentric! This is a scientific standard?
Aren’t “odd or eccentric ways of thinking,” as mentioned earlier, obligatory for scientists who in fact improve our models of reality? And won’t diagnoses of insanity (okay, ‘mental illness’), if this standard is adopted, be more forthcoming from psychiatrists who are painfully dull and conventional hyper-conformists?
You can see the problem. How to solve it? By looking for other signs of behavioral abnormality in the possibly paranoid patient?
Nope—that won’t do. Because people with pronounced social oddities or eccentricities, without ever confusing fantastical ideation with reality, may possess a competent or even above-average grasp of evidence and causality (again, many outstanding scientists come to mind). No, Fromm was right: “Consensual validation as such”—a socially derived (or psychiatrically imposed) standard of ‘normal’—“has no bearing whatsoever on reason or mental health.”
To identify a genuine paranoid pathology one must find the sufferer to be disconnected from reality. However, no such disconnection can be identified by reference only to the patient’s assertions and to the (American) psychiatrist’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)—even if that manual is assumed to be scientifically reasonable (big ‘if’…). Why? Because one must also know what reality is, and that ain’t in the manual!
To see what I mean, suppose that someone reports being haunted by the hypothesis that a secret organization has taken control of political power, or reports the perception of being in mortal personal danger from agents of that presumed organization. Or suppose that someone believes that everyone in a social psychology lab was colluding to suck him into a fake reality. If psychiatrists already consider such reports as symptomatic of the pathologically ‘abnormal,’ the inquiry is circular. There is no inquiry. But it ain’t paranoia if they’re really out to get you, as an old saw wisely points out. Proper diagnosis therefore requires an investigation of the world—not just the patient. That, however, is something that no psychiatrist usually attempts.
An entertaining parable of these problems is Richard Donner’s Conspiracy Theory, written by Brian Helgeland.

Helgeland and Donner are careful to construct their main character, Jerry Fletcher (Mel Gibson), as the type of person whom a psychiatrist would be tempted to diagnose as ‘insane.’ His style of speech, stutter, and sometimes wild eye movements are “odd or eccentric.” The same may be said for his thoughts: he believes that a malevolent secret organization is out to get him. And he defends, moreover, very nonstandard theories of political causality. Except that reality turns out to match Fletcher’s claims rather precisely. He is not mad: he is being persecuted by MK-Ultra psychiatrists, whose clutches he has escaped.
MK-Ultra—what is that?
‘Project MK-Ultra’—the CIA ‘mind-control’ program, as they called it—was first exposed in the 1975 Church-Committee hearings in the US Senate. MK-Ultra was a giant and secret government conspiracy that maimed and destroyed unknown numbers of innocent human beings who were unethically experimented on by the CIA and their affiliated psychiatric researchers at over 30 universities, including by psychiatrist Donald Ewen Cameron, who became “the first chairman of the World Psychiatric Association as well as president of both the American Psychiatric Association and the Canadian Psychiatric Association.”14 These crimes were committed to see if they could develop techniques by which humans might be controlled in the manner of robots.
MK-Ultra was an outrage to chill your blood—the sort of thing you’d expect German Nazis to carry out, and it was indeed inspired in the criminal medical experiments of the German Nazis.
In the film Conspiracy Theory, Fletcher has escaped the chief MK-Ultra psychiatrist, so it is entirely convenient for that evil character (played by Patrick Stewart) to impose on Fletcher—whose mind he has certainly damaged—the diagnosis of ‘insanity,’ and to use that diagnosis to try and reassert control over Fletcher.
The larger point is that such diagnoses are convenient to psychopathic State bureaucrats who abuse the citizens, for then whoever disputes and denounces the government’s self-serving official ‘reality’ may be drugged and incarcerated. (That is precisely what happens to Fletcher in the film.)
Mind you, it is hardly necessary for all or even most psychiatrists to collude consciouslywith the intelligence services to achieve the cultural result where ‘conspiracy theorizing’ is understood to be symptomatic of a mental pathology.
Psychiatrists are natives of ‘polite society,’ the institutionally and culturally dominant socioeconomic cohort of the university-trained, and such people are already raised to believe that ‘conspiracy theory’ is utter nonsense that only uneducated ‘rednecks’ (without university training) will consider. As conventional Politers, psychiatrists already lean towards pathologizing those who deviate from local normativity, so they will naturally do the same with conspiracy theorists, calling them ‘mentally ill’: paranoid.
The psychiatric power of the State
The film Conspiracy Theory embodies the problem that Szasz identifies: “when this role [‘mentally ill’] is imposed on a person against his will,” he writes, “it serves the interests of those who define him as mentally ill. … it is ascribed in the hope of social control” (emphases mine).15
Yes, and the social control achieved extends beyond the person so diagnosed. Here lies the penetrating power of Szasz’s analysis. For whatever we may think of this legal circumstance, we all know that State-empowered psychiatrists do indeed cart people off to be incarcerated, and so we all silently dread that we might seem crazy to others. That latent diagnostic threat, like a Damoclean sword over our heads, coerces conformity and docility with the locally dominant reality consensus.
Invoking (perhaps unintentionally) echoes of Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization, Szasz argues that here lies the creeping reincarnation of Medieval totalitarianism in modern form.
“Formerly, when Church and State were allied, people accepted theological justifications for state-sanctioned coercion. Today, when Medicine and the State are allied, people accept therapeutic justifications for state-sanctioned coercion. This is how, some two hundred years ago, psychiatry became an arm of the coercive apparatus of the state. And this is why today all of medicine threatens to become transformed from personal therapy into political tyranny.”16
In light of our recent COVID experience, which included a sweeping attack against our citizen rights and liberties using the medical profession as a cudgel, I want to say that Szasz was prophetic. Sadly, however, he didn’t need to be, for this had all happened before: the United States government used professional doctors and psychologists to impose political tyranny, to great effect, during the heyday of the eugenics movement, when Szasz was only a child, though the key diagnosis employed then to incarcerate dissidents was not ‘insanity’ but ‘mental retardation.’

EUGENICS. Before WWII, the US power elite were major sponsors of the eugenics movement, which became German Nazism.
Now consider, with Szasz, the evolutionary process in which totalitarians adapt to changing political conditions. Over the centuries, Szasz claims, the bosses have substituted one institution (the Church) with another (psychiatry) but they preserved the function.
When Church and State are joined, arbitrary power is maximized by taking the most common, necessary, and desired behaviors (e.g., sex) and calling them ‘sins.’ The same is done for almost any stray dissenting thought, calling it blasphemy or heresy. Only State-sanctioned torture and death may redeem such ‘sins,’ which, being naught but human nature, are inevitable, and place the entire population under suspicion. In this manner, the most troublesome can be picked off at will and turned into vivid examples for the rest: inquisition, torture, witch hunts, burnings, forced conversions, etc.
When Medicine and State are joined, as in our modern world, the same functional result may be had by enlarging the category ‘mentally ill’ to encompass essentially everyone and treating even minor deviations from State-sponsored official ‘reality’ as evidence of a psychiatric disorder. Such disorders may require, at the limit, forcible hospitalization and drugging (to heal the patient from his politically deviant madness).
In this manner, the psychiatric pressure to accept reality, backed by State power, becomes a coercive tool to enforce the citizen’s obedience to officially sanctioned narratives.
But can this really happen today in the modern West?
Allen Frances, another psychiatrist, points out that
“psychiatric diagnosis is now being abused for preventive detention of … peasants complaining about corruption in China and previously was an excuse to hospitalize political dissidents in the Soviet Union.”17
And in the United States?
The COVID crisis revealed that, in our day, Big Pharma is a powerfully corrupting force. Consider only that Bill Gates, one of the biggest investors in Big Pharma, is also responsible for funding the World Health Organization (WHO) and the most important health ministries of the West and other places. That sounds to me like a conflict of interest. And Bill Gates has on his payroll the very researcher whose COVID model was wielded by the WHO and the health ministries to impose the draconian lockdowns, and then the so-called COVID ‘vaccines,’ that made such giant profits for Bill Gates.

Did Bill Gates order the COVID lockdowns?
Now, if Big Pharma is engaged in widespread corruption, then, assuming they are immoral, wouldn’t they want to corrupt the psychiatrists? Of course they would, because Big Pharma benefits when psychiatrists adopt the ‘chemical imbalance’ paradigm and arbitrarily reduce the category ‘normal,’ which allows Big Pharma to market many addictive pills that will then push their profits into the trillions.
In his book Saving Normal, psychiatrist Allen Frances—once called “the most powerful psychiatrist in America” because he oversaw the editing of the DSM-IV—accuses that Big Pharma has indeed corrupted psychiatry in order to squeeze the definition of ‘normal’ into extinction, so that any one of us can be easily and arbitrarily diagnosed as mentally ill.
This, of course, greatly expands the powers of the State, for as ‘normal’ becomes ever narrower, it becomes easier and easier for the bosses to declare you ‘crazy.’
In my next piece on this topic, I will take a good look at Frances’ accusations:

If you would like to read some of my own work explaining the conformist bias, then I recommend:
Gil-White, F. J. (2005). How conformism creates ethnicity creates conformism (and why this matters to lots of things). The Monist, 88(2), 189-237.
http://www.hirhome.com/conformism.pdf
Sabini, J. (1992). Social Psychology. United Kingdom: Norton. (pp.22-23)
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological monographs: General and applied, 70(9), 1. (p.29)
Reina, A. (2010). The spectrum of sanity and insanity. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36(1), 3-8.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2800139/#
‘The Chemical Imbalance Theory: Dr. Pies Returns, Again’; Mad in America: Science, Psychiatry, and Social Justice; 22 July 2019; by Phillip Hickey.
https://www.madinamerica.com/2019/07/chemical-imbalance-theory-dr-pies-returns-again/
Szasz, Thomas. (2011[1974). The Myth of Mental Illness. HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. (loc.56)
The Myth of Mental Illness (op. cit.) loc.303-330
The Myth of Mental Illness (op. cit.) loc.330
The Myth of Mental Illness (op. cit.) p.257
Szasz, Thomas. The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct . HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. (loc.305)
‘Paranoid Personality Disorder’; WebMD; 25 August 2022; Written by WebMD Editorial Contributors and medically Reviewed by Smitha Bhandari.
https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/paranoid-personality-disorder#1
‘Paranoia’; WebMD; 9 September 2021; Written by Paul Frysh, and Medically Reviewed by Jennifer Casarella, MD.
https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/why-paranoid#1
‘Paranoid Personality Disorder’ (op. cit)
The Myth of Mental Illness (op. cit.) p.188
The Myth of Mental Illness (op. cit.) loc.330
Frances, Allen. (2013). Saving Normal. William Morrow. Kindle Edition. (p.20)



